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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

v,

:

ALBERT JAMES GROSSI,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

:

Case No. 20020151 -CA

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
The State makes two principal arguments in this case. First, the State argues that
Officer Jason Knight's original entry into Appellant Albert James Grossi's apartment is
justified because Mr. Grossi consented to the entry. Appellee's Br. 8-9. Second, the State
argues that Officer's Knight's subsequent "sweep" of the apartment is justified by exigent
circumstances. Appellee's Br. 16.
While neither of these arguments is correct, the State covers very little that was not
already explored in the opening brief. So, Mr. Grossi restricts this reply to two sub-issues
not previously addressed.
First, Mr. Grossi responds to the State's suggestion that, even if he did not consent
to Officer Knight's entry, the entry was justified because it was reasonable. The
reasonableness standard is an inappropriately moderate standard which does not apply in
this case. And, the State supports its argument only with cases involving the inventorying
of impounded automobiles. But here, the officer did not impound an automobile, he

illegally entered a home. So, a stringent standard of review applies.
Second, Mr. Grossi responds to the State's heavy reliance upon Officer Knight's
subjective feelings of apprehension to justify the "sweep" of the apartment. Appellee's
Br. 21-22. As will be shown, such feelings are simply not enough to support of finding of
exigent circumstances. Such feelings are nothing more than a hunch, and a hunch is not
enough to justify a warrantless intrusion into a home.

ARGUMENT
I. THE ILLEGAL ENTRY INTO MR. GROSSPS HOME CANNOT BE
JUSTIFIED BY LABELING IT A CARETAKING FUNCTION
The State argues that cases emphasizing the need for unambiguous consent to
enter a home are not on point,1 and then urges this Court to accept the idea that home
1

The State attempts to distinguish cases cited by Mr. Grossi by claiming they are
factually different or by implying that they have been rejected in Utah. However, all of these
claims are either incorrect or irrelevant.
Specifically, the State erroneously claims that the 10th Circuit case of State v. Iribe does
not apply in this case because it involves a portion of the "voluntariness" standard rejected by
the United States Supreme Court and the Utah Supreme Court. Appellee's Br. 14 n.6 (citing
State v. Bisner, 2001 UT 99, 37 P.3d 1073). However, the issue in this case is not whether the
consent was voluntary, but whether there was consent at all. Furthermore, Iribe addresses the
issue of consent, United States v. Iribe, 11 F.3d 1553, 1556 (10th Cir. 1993), and so it is
appropriately applied here. Also, Iribe is not part of the "voluntariness" test rejected in
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte. 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973). In fact, it applies the "totality of
circumstances" test from Schneckloth, and emphasizes that the burden is on the government to
show,first,that consent was given, and second, that it was freely given. Iribe, 11 F.3d at 1557.
The case mentioned by the State, State v. Bisner, does not specifically reject Iribe or its holdings.
State v. Bisner, 2001 UT 99,1J47, 37 P.3d 1073. And so, the State's argument is incorrect.
Also, the State claims that the holdings of Bumper v. North Carolina are not on point
because, there, the police entered the home by a claim of authority, and they did not do that here.
2

entries are legal if they are reasonable. Appellee's Br. 13-16. However, the State confuses
the standard applicable to inventorying an impounded car with the warrantless intrusion
into a home. A warrantless intrusion into a home may be justified only if the intrusion
falls into one of the specific, well-defined exceptions to the warrant requirement. State v.
Brown. 853 P.2d 851, 855 (Utah 1992). This standard is equivalent to that of probable
cause. Colorado v. Bertine. 479 U.S. 367, 371 (1987). Conversely, when the police
impound a car after arresting the driver for an offense, the much-lower reasonableness
standard applies. South Dakota v. Opperman. 428 U.S. 364, 370-71 (1976).
There are several reasons for this. One reason involves the inherent mobility of
automobiles. As the United States Supreme Court has noted, this mobility gives rise to
practical circumstances which make the rigorous enforcement of the warrant requirement
impossible. Id at 367. Another reason is that people simply have a lower expectation of
privacy in their automobiles than in their homes. Id, Automobiles are subject to extensive
regulation and controls, involving both the condition and operation of the car. Id at 368.

Appellee's Br. 13-14. However, the holdings of Bumper are on point. These holdings are that the
government has the burden of showing that consent was given, and that it was freely given.
Bumper v. North Carolina. 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968). These general holdings are not
inapplicable simply because this case is not factually identical to Bumper.
Finally, the State claims that the 10th Circuit case of United States v. Salinas-Cano is not
on point because it involved consent given by someone other than the owner of the searched
suitcase. Appellee's Br. 14. That is not the case here. Id. However, Salinas-Cano is cited for its
general holdings that the government has the burden of proving consent, and the consent cannot
be ambiguous. United States v. Salinas-Cano. 959 F.2d 861, 862-64 (10th Cir. 1992). These
holdings apply here, and a factual difference between Salinas-Cano and this case does not make
these holdings any less pertinent.
3

"It travels public thoroughfares where both its occupants and its contents are in plain
view," and may cause public hazards. Id. (quotations omitted). So, people cannot expect
the same level of privacy in their automobiles as in their homes. Finally, police are often
required to take automobiles into custody as part of their "community caretaking
functions." Icl (quotations omitted). And when they do so, the automobiles may be
subject to routine inventorying practices. L± at 369.
Needless to say, none of these conditions exist with regard to people's homes. In
fact, the very cases which the State cites for support strongly emphasize that the
automobile inventorying holdings do not apply to the entry and search of homes:
This Court has traditionally drawn a distinction between automobiles and
homes or offices in relation to the Fourth Amendment. Although
automobiles are "effects" and thus within the reach of the Fourth
Amendment... warrantless examinations of automobiles have been upheld
in circumstances in which a search of a home or office would not.
Id at 367 (citations omitted). This is because protecting the home from illegal
government intrusion is the driving force behind the Fourth Amendment. This has
frequently been recognized by the United States Supreme Court, the Utah Supreme Court,
and this Court. Indeed, this Court acknowledges that "[p]hysical entry of the home is the
chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed." State v.
Beavers, 859 P.2d 9, 13 (1993). Also, the Utah Supreme Court has declared that "[t]he
primary protection afforded citizens against official, arbitrary intrusions into their homes
and other private places is the requirement of a search warrant issued by a magistrate on
proof that probable cause exists to invade a person's privacy." State v. Nielsen. 727 P.2d
4

188, 194 (1986). The United States Supreme Court has declared that "[a] greater burden
is placed . . . on officials who enter a home or dwelling without consent. Freedom from
intrusion into the home or swelling is the archetype of the privacy protection secured by
the Fourth Amendment." Pavton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587 (1979). In sum, courts
have always treated the intrusion into homes differently than the intrusion into
automobiles.
Nonetheless, the State seizes upon the idea that Officer Knight was merely
performing a car-impounding-type "caretaking function" by entering Mr. Grossi's home,
and that the reasonableness standard applies. Appellee's Br. 15. This argument should not
be given any credence. The community caretaking function of the police should never be
confused with the officers' duty to abide by the constitution after arresting someone
outside of his home. Indeed, the car-impounding cases themselves warn that the
"caretaking" label should never be inappropriately applied to justify an illegal search.
Oppermam 428 U.S. at 373-76. And, as the United States Supreme Court has explained,
the community caretaking function is "totally divorced from the detection, investigation,
or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute."2 In this case, the
police were investigating a report of domestic violence, R. 168 [5-7], not impounding a
car. And, there is nothing to show that the car-impounding cases apply, or that the
2

Cadv v. Dombrowski. 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973). See also United States v. RodriguezMorales, 929 F.2d 780, 785 (1st Cir. 1991) (emphasizing that the community caretaking rationale
should not be extended beyond its original purpose); United States v. Lugo, 978 F.2d 631, 636
(10th Cir. 1992) (court refuses to justify search of door pocket of car on basis that it was part of a
community caretaking function).
5

justifications from these cases apply to people's homes. And so, the State's argument that
the reasonableness standard applies should be rejected.

II. CONTRARY TO THE STATE'S ARGUMENT, AN OFFICER'S
HUNCH CANNOT BE THE BASIS FOR A FINDING OF EXIGENT
CIRCUMSTANCES
The exigent circumstances exception to the rule that officers must have a search
warrant to enter a home cannot be supported by an officer's instinctive feeling that
something may be wrong. There must be much more. Indeed, this Court has recently
declared that the exigent circumstances doctrine "should be strictly circumscribed"
because it is a significant departure from the Fourth Amendment. State v. Comer, 2002
UT App 219,^17, 51 P.3d 55.
This means that, at a minimum, the State must prove that the officer had an
objectively reasonable basis to believe that an emergency existed and there was an
immediate need to enter.3 In other words, there must have been circumstances "that
would cause a reasonable person to believe that entry . . . was necessary to prevent
physical harm to the officers or other persons, the destruction of relevant evidence, the
escape of the suspect, or some other consequence improperly frustrating legitimate law

3

Id at f5 n.l (quoting Salt Lake City v. Davidson. 2000 UT App 12, f 10-13, 994 P.2d
1283). Notably, there are two other requirements that must be met before a finding of exigent
circumstances may be made. Namely, that "[t]he search is not primarily motived by intent to
arrest and seize evidence; [and] [tjhere is some reasonable basis to associate the emergency with
the area or place to be searched. That is, there must be a connection with the area to be searched
and the emergency." Id.
6

enforcement efforts." Id at <p4 (quotations omitted). Importantly, this standard
emphasizes that a reasonable person, not just a specially-trained law enforcer, must
believe there is an emergency. It is an objective, not subjective, standard. In short, "a
police officer's subjective beliefs are not the benchmark." State v. Wright 1999 UT App
86,^8, 977 P.2d 505.
Of course, police are not required to ignore their training and knowledge in
determining whether there are exigent circumstances. If officers discern something, either
because of their training or their personal knowledge of a situation, which would indicate
to a reasonable person that an emergency or other urgency is in progress, this, along with
other facts, could support a finding of exigent circumstances. State v. Poole, 871 P.2d
531, 535 (Utah 1994). However, the thing discerned must be a thing that, if known by an
ordinary person, would cause the ordinary person to believe that an emergency exists.4 It
4

Id at 534-35; Comer, 2002 UT App. 219,1(24-25. One example of this is the case of
State v. Ramirez, in which this Court found that exigent circumstances supported an officer's
intrusion into a home. In that case, an officer had been called to hasten his response to a request
for back-up in handling a "drunk" near Trolley Square in Salt Lake City. State v. Ramirez, 814
P.2d 1131,1132 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). When he arrived, he found two men fleeing on foot,
pursued by another police officer. Id at 1133. One man fell down and was apprehended. IdL
However, the back-up officer continued chasing the second man, and chased him into a nearby
house. Id. Inside the house the officer was confronted by a small, frenzied dog. Id Another
officer arrived to assist, and they eventually chased the dog out of the house and arrested the
second man.
Later, it appeared that the man who had fallen was the principal perpetrator, and the man
who had run into the house was a peripheral figure. Id. at 1133-34.
However, this Court held that the intrusion into the home was justified by exigent
circumstances. Id at 1134. In making its holding, this Court noted that the back-up officer, by
virtue of his nineteen years of police experience, knew that calls to hasten back-up "usually
indicated that the on-scene officer was being assaulted or that other serious problems were
7

cannot be a mere feeling of trouble. This is a hunch and a hunch does not support a
finding of exigent circumstances, even if the hunch is made by a trained law enforcement
officer.5
Further, an emergency or other urgency won't generally require interpretation by a
specialized law enforcer. The cases in which exigent circumstances have been found
involve readily discernable emergencies or other urgencies. For instance, exigent
circumstances exist where a raging fire prompts entry by firefighters,6 a crime suspect
begins to destroy crucial evidence,7 the police are in hot pursuit of a suspect,8 or a parent
telephones 911 to report a child's injury and request emergency assistance. State v.
Genovesi. 909 P.2d 916, 921 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).

developing." Id. at 1132. Therefore, when he arrived and observed the on-scene officer pursing
two men, it was reasonable to believe that both men had committed offenses. Id. at 1134. This
Court also emphasized that "a reasonable and prudent person" would have believed that both
men had committed offenses. Id
5

See Wright. 1999 UT App 86, f 8 ("Probable cause is present when the facts and
circumstances within [the officers'] knowledge and of which they have reasonably trustworthy
information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the
belief that an offense has been or is being committed.") (quotations omitted); State v. White. 856
P.2d 656, 660 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) ("The Terry Court refused to sanction any intrusion based
on nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches.") (quotations omitted); State v.
Baumgaertel. 762 P.2d 2, 3 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) ("The officer's good faith is not enough . . .
and his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch, by itself, is insufficient to justify such
a stop.") (quotations omitted).
6

See Michigan v. Clifford. 464 U.S. 287, 291-92 (1984) (although fire justified
firefighters' entry into home, investigator's entry into home half a day after the fire was
extinguished was not justified).
7

Illinois v. McArthur. 531 U.S. 326, 331-32 (2001); State v. Ashe. 745 P.2d 1255, 125860 (Utah 1987); Citvof Orem v. Henrie. 868 P.2d 1384, 1388 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
8

State v. Ramirez. 814 P.2d 1131, 1134 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
8

What is more, the standard of proof for demonstrating that exigent circumstances
existed is high. Reasonable suspicion does not justify the entry. State v. Beavers, 859
P.2d 9, 23 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Nor does mere nervousness on the part of an occupant.9
Only a strong showing that exigent circumstances exists justifies the entry. This
prosecutorial burden is heavy, but it is necessary because of the constitutional prohibition
against warrantless intrusion into homes and the abhorrence that we as a society have for
such practices.10
Yet, in this case, the State has proven almost nothing to support its assertion that
exigent circumstances existed. It merely states that, although an "untrained observer" may
not see exigent circumstances, Officer Knight, by virtue of his experience and training,
saw them. Appellee's Br. 20. Nothing else is specified other than that Chandra Karren
emerged from the bedroom as he tried to lock Mr. Grossi's door, and she appeared
nervous.11 This is simply not enough.
9

See Ashe. 745 P.2d at 1258 ("Generally, exigency does not evolve from one individual
fact. Instead, there is often a mosaic of evidence, no single part of which is itself sufficient. Our
task is to review the totality of the facts and circumstances of the particular case to determine if
the finding of exigency was proper.")
10

Beavers. 859 P.2d at 13. In Beavers, this Court pointed out that "[p]hysical entry of the
home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed . . . . " Id.
Therefore, "warrantless searches and seizures within a home or other private premises are per se
unreasonable absent exigent circumstances.... Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold
may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant." Id. (quotations omitted).
11

Appellee's Br. 19-21. The State also cites the fact that this is a domestic violence case
and reviews the events that occurred before Mr. Grossi's arrest. Appellee's Br. 19. However,
these events had ended with Mr. Grossi's arrest. It was not until after the arrest that Officer
Knight took it upon himself to lock the apartment door. R. 167 [9]. So, these events are
irrelevant to the issue of whether exigent circumstances justified Officer Knight's sweep of the
9

Certainly, it is far cry from those cases which have found that exigent
circumstances justified entry. One case, State v. Comer, is on point. In that case, this
Court considered whether exigent circumstances justified entry into a home where a
domestic dispute was allegedly in progress. Comer. 2002 UT App 219, ^[24-26. The
officers had knocked on the door and it was opened only a few inches. Id,, at ^[2. Then a
woman, Misty Comer, stepped out onto the porch. Id, She told the officers that her
husband was inside and then, "without explanation, immediately turned and walked back
inside the residence." Id. (quotations omitted). The officers followed her into the home
and down the hallway to a bedroom. Id. at ^3. Ms. Comer looked into the bedroom and
told her husband that the police were there. IdL Mr. Comer came out and the officers
observed scratches on his chest, neck, and back. Id Ms. Comer admitted scratching Mr.
Comer. Id. The officers arrested her for domestic violence assault, and in the course of
making that arrest, found drugs and drug paraphernalia. Id. at ^[4.
In reviewing the case, this Court first found that the "emergency aid" doctrine, in
which warrantless entry into a home is justified by the need to render medical assistance,
did not apply. Id at ^[19. The Court also explained that a report of domestic violence was
simply not enough to support the entry:
Properly circumscribed, the emergency aid doctrine does not apply to the
facts of this case because the information available to the police was
insufficient to support an objectively reasonable belief that an unconscious,
apartment. Further, this Court has emphasized that a report of domestic violence does not
support "an objectively reasonable belief that a person has been seriously injured." Comer. 2002
UT App 219,^20.
10

semi-conscious, or missing person feared injured or dead might be in the
Comers' home. On the contrary, the only information the officers had was a
report of a family fight in progress, Misty's indication her husband was
home, and Misty's "somewhat sudden and unexplained retreat into the
house.

14
Significantly, this Court refused to make an automatic inference of danger solely
on the basis of a reliable report of domestic violence:
We decline to adopt a rule whereby a reliable domestic disturbance report,
by itself, would be viewed as supporting an objectively reasonable belief
that a person has been seriously injured. Rather, we conclude there must be
some reliable and specific indication of the probability that a person is
suffering from a serious physical injury before application of the medical
emergency doctrine is justified. Here even in light of the "family fight in
progress" report, Misty's actions, although suspicious, did not reasonably
suggest an immediate medical emergency of the degree necessary to trigger
the emergency aid doctrine.
Id at 1f20.
Then this Court moved on to the closely-related question of whether the entry was
justified by exigent circumstances, which are those in which a reasonable person may
believe that entry is necessary to prevent physical harm, the destruction of evidence, or an
escape. Id. at ^[24. In examining that issue, this Court called this "a close case," and
ultimately concluded that there were exigent circumstances. Id at ^25. In so holding, this
Court explained that, if the police have probable cause to believe that domestic violence
is in progress or has just occurred, there are exigent circumstances. Id. at ^|27. This Court
expressly rejected a more liberal approach which would allow warrantless entry after a
"corroborated anonymous report of a domestic dispute." Id at n.l 1. This Court also
11

rejected an approach which allows a report of domestic violence to act as a per se exigent
circumstance. IdL
In sum, this Court has held that only the high standard of probable cause that
domestic violence is being or has been committed allows entry into a home under the
exigent circumstances doctrine.12 And, while an officer's experience may be relevant
insofar as it brings to light articulable bases for a belief that illegal activity is in progress,
a general feeling of trouble is not enough. Probable cause exists:
where the facts and circumstances within [the officers'] knowledge and of
which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in
themselves to warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief that an
offense has been or is being committed.
Comer, 2002 UT App 219 ^[21. This, at a minimum, requires that the officer be able to
articulate sound bases for believing that domestic violence is in progress or has just
ended.
In this case, there are no sound, articulable bases for Officer Knight's sweep of the
apartment. Of course, had a victim called out in pain from the bedroom, or shouting was
heard, or something similar occurred, this case would be different. But that did not
happen. There was nothing other than Ms. Karren's nervousness. And so, a finding of
exigent circumstances is not supported, and Officer Knight's sweep of the apartment
violated the Fourth Amendment.
12

Id at 1f27. See also Beavers, 859 P.2d at 15 ("We view the Santana Court's articulation
of the hot pursuit doctrine as nothing more than a specific application of the general rule that a
warrantless entry of a private residence must be justified by probable cause and exigent
circumstances.")
12

CONCLUSION
In sum, Mr. Grossi requests that this Court reverse Mr. Grossi's conviction and
remand this case with instructions to suppress the evidence that resulted from the police
officers' unconstitutional search and seizure.
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